Early evidence suggests that Brazil's Bolsa Família ('Family Stipend') 
Many developing countries have introduced or greatly expanded conditional cash transfer programs to address mass poverty, with schemes in over 45 countries assisting more than 110 million families (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008) . They distribute regular cash payments in exchange for beneficiary compliance with conditionalities such as children's regular school attendance, health check-ups and participation in vaccination and nutritional programs.
This strategy is designed to strengthen human capital as a precondition for development and provide incentives for the deprived to invest in their children's future (World Bank, 2000) . At the same time, the exercising of 'co-responsibility' through the imposition of obligations on recipients provides a moral justification for giving cash to the 'deserving poor'. According to the conventional wisdom, giving 'something for nothing' is considered unproductive and not 'proper' development (Hanlon et al., 2010) .
Although the onward march of conditional cash transfer is an increasingly global phenomenon, nowhere is the trend more pronounced than in Latin America, where every major country now has its own package. They range from relatively small-scale program as in Chile and Peru, to the huge schemes of Mexico (Oportunidades) and Brazil (Bolsa Família) . This enthusiasm is not fortuitous. For a variety of reasons, income transfer schemes are highly attractive to policy-makers, and indeed to the beneficiaries themselves. To a degree, this popularity is down to the relative simplicity of conditional cash transfers as policy instruments. They offer a fast, effective and relatively inexpensive means of tackling extreme poverty by directing resources at the most needy groups in society.
For the families themselves, cash transfers provide a useful income supplement, which for the poorest can be highly significant, even critical, in terms of livelihood support.
They are particularly appealing to major international donors, which increasingly provide strong ideological and technical backing, notably the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in the case of Latin America. Indeed, one experienced multilateral development practitioner considers them to be, 'as close as you can come to a magic bullet' (cited in Hanlon et al., 2010, p. 61) .
Be that as it may, however, some observers would argue that the quest for a quick and apparently neutral 'development fix' obscures deeper political drivers behind cash transfer programs that serve agendas other than those of poverty alleviation and social development.
It would be naïve in the extreme to think that any development program could be totally apolitical. Fittingly, in Latin-based languages such as Portuguese, the term for 'policy' (política) also translates as 'politics'. Yet it is important to understand how political factors affect the design and implementation of conditional cash transfer programs.
Political distortions may result in high opportunity costs and limited program effectiveness, while compromising longer-term development prospects.
After outlining the contextual background and operational details of Bolsa Família, this paper will examine its political dimensions as well as some implications for the future of social policy in Brazil.
CONTEXT OF BOLSA FAMÍLIA
Bolsa Família ('family stipend') is the world's largest conditional cash transfer program. It currently reaches almost 13 million families, a population of 50 million, about one-quarter of Brazil's total. Conditional cash transfers were introduced sporadically in Brazil at the sub-national level during the 1990s on a modest scale at municipal and state levels. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) expanded them nationally into sector programs for education, child labour and nutrition. Yet it was under the administration of his successor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-10) , that a national umbrella program was instituted, originally called Fome Zero ('Zero Hunger'). After a few months, however, this met with growing criticism due to poor inter-ministerial coordination, inconsistent beneficiary selection methods, duplication and overlap of benefits, the lack of a complete unified database, inadequate banking procedures and numerous other technical problems (Hall, 2006) .
In October 2003 President Lula's government re-launched the program and labelled it
Bolsa Família, integrating four separate schemes; Bolsa Escola for education, the Bolsa Alimentação food program, the PETI anti-child labour scheme, and a cooking gas subsidy.
Integration and streamlining would enhance efficiency and strengthen synergies among sub- (Hall, 2008) .
Operation
Bolsa Família is targeted at two groups, based on self-declared household income:
'very poor' families with per capita monthly incomes of up to R$70 (US$44) and 'poor' families with up to R$140 (US$88). 'Very poor' families receive a minimum flat rate payment of R$70 (US$44) a month regardless of whether they have children. In addition, eligible households are paid according to the number of children they have, receiving R$32 (US$20) for each of a maximum of five up to the age of 15 (increased from three in 2011), plus a further R$38 each for up to two children aged 16-17. The latter provision for older children was introduced to encourage them to stay on longer at school. beneficiaries were ejected from the program either because they no longer qualified or they failed to re-register. However, some flexibility was introduced in the rules to allow extra informal income under certain conditions without placing Bolsa Família membership at risk (IPEA, 2010) .
In addition to these monthly payments to households, there are further benefits. A cooking gas subsidy (Auxílio Gás) of R$15 (US$9) is granted every two months to the same families. In the poor Northeast of Brazil, a food card system (Cartão Alimentação) was introduced to provide a monthly basic food subsidy of R$50 (US$31). Taken together, they comprise a valuable income supplement and are comparable with, or better than, payments made in other conditional cash transfer programs such as Mexico's Oportunidades (de la Brière and Rawlings, 2006) . Many of the poorest in areas where employment is in short supply, as in the rural Northeast and North, for example, rely heavily on these federal government transfers.
Program Impacts
By any standards, the achievements of Bolsa Família have been impressive, both in terms of national coverage and of its economic and social consequences. The program met its original target of 11.1 million poor families, or 44 million people, within just three years at the end of 2006 (MDS, 2007) . It has continued to grow and by March 2011 had reached almost 13 million households, over a quarter of the total population (FSP, 2011a).
Furthermore, average benefits per family have risen from R$75 per month to, as noted above, R$115 a month. Research shows that BF contributes up to 10 percent of household income (Bastagli, 2011) ; however, in poorer regions such as the electorally crucial Northeast, this figure could be significantly higher.
Bolsa Família is credited with being relatively effective and the best targeted conditional cash transfer program in Latin America. Almost three-quarters of benefits reach the poorest 20 percent of the population (FAO, 2006) . This compares well with other countries on the continent where targeting is considered to be far less accurate, such as Chile (58 percent), Mexico and Argentina (both 32 percent). Another achievement of the program has been to draw into the safety net groups that have in the past often been excluded from similar welfare projects. Street dwellers, indigenous groups, isolated jungle and other rural communities now participate. Some 20 percent of BF beneficiaries are located in the Amazon, although many in the region remain excluded and will surely be brought on board in future extensions of the program (Mattei, 2011) . This broad coverage has been facilitated by the scheme's highly decentralised implementation structure, administered through municipalities.
Evidence suggests that Bolsa Família has contributed towards a steady decline in levels of absolute poverty in Brazil, although it is by no means the only or even the principal contributing factor. According to official figures (IPEA, 2010) , absolute poverty in Brazil Notwithstanding the exaggerated claims made by some policy-makers and commentators about the positive impacts of income transfer programs in Brazil, independent researchers estimate that these transfers account for about one-third of the reduction in poverty in the country, and Bolsa Família itself accounts for one-sixth (IPEA, 2006; Soares, 2011 ). Yet there are other major economic factors at work besides income transfer programs.
Principle among these has been the legal minimum wage, which increased by 23 percent in real terms during President Lula's first term (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Other reasons include low inflation, increased access to consumer credit and greater employment opportunities generated by strong economic growth. Taken together, these factors have helped stimulate local economies, especially in poorer regions that depend more heavily on personal spending (IPEA, 2008) . Arguably, these developments all contribute to perceptions amongst many voters in the less privileged echelons of society that some economic progress and government policies are finally working in their favour.
In addition to creating tangible economic benefits, there is growing evidence that Bolsa Família resulted in improved social indicators. Early assessments of Bolsa Família were tentative and necessarily cautious in their conclusions given the limited implementation period at the time (MDS, 2007; Soares et al., 2007) . However, a follow-up evaluation carried out by the United States based International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), using a sample survey of some 15,500 beneficiaries in 269 municipalities, was more conclusive and positive . It found significant improvements among beneficiary children compared with non-beneficiaries. These included better vaccination rates and nutritional status, more intensive use of antenatal facilities by mothers, higher levels of school attendance and faster educational progress, especially in the poor Northeast. This is consistent with favourable evaluations of conditional cash transfer programs elsewhere in Latin America that have helped to reduce poverty while improving education and health outcomes (Bastagli, 2011) . Bolsa Família has generally been lauded as a highly effective and relatively efficient anti-poverty strategy, but its less discernible political dimensions are often underplayed. As noted, the program has its origins in a number of diverse sector interventions, each with its own perspective, priorities and competing interests within the government machine. Soares (2011) identified four major strands competing for space during the initial Bolsa Família design period; human development, education as an independent input, a guaranteed basic unconditional income transfer scheme, and a food security approach. Elements of all these views were eventually incorporated into the final package, with human development and basic income transfers gaining the upper hand.
In terms of the political consequences and implications of Bolsa Família, two major dimensions will be addressed: electoral and structural. 'Electoral' gains concern the extent to which, deliberately or otherwise, through the electoral process Bolsa Família has served to strengthen the political position and the image of those leaders at its helm, especially A further political dimension that reinforced the Preident's political influence and reputation as benefactor to the poor concerns the particular kind of locally oriented 'bossist' clientelism that developed in Brazil. Rather than over-centralise Bolsa Família and tie distribution of benefits according to declared party loyalties, as might happen in a corporatist system, many operational responsibilities were devolved to local management committees and to mayors. In this context, broader non-partisan coverage is likely to generate wider political support for the president than a highly selective approach.
As Ansell & Mitchell (2011, p. 310) note, "in order to ensure that conditional cash transfers translate into electoral gains for the president, local discretion has to be attenuated through the extension of coverage to all the poor, and poverty has to be defined loosely enough that most of the population receives the CCT." There were press reports, for example, that some Workers' Party mayors were portraying Bolsa Família as President da Silva's personal 'gift' to the people (FSP, 2006b) . The President also presented himself in the media as 'father of the poor' and was very closely associated with the Bolsa Família message in publicity campaigns, in which his portrait figured prominently. Thus, poor voters expressing their gratitude to a president who appeared to be serving their interests at last was, arguably, an entirely rational response.
In addition to any material benefits accrued from Bolsa Família and other income transfer programs the sheer force of the President's charismatic personality should not be discounted as a significant factor in explaining his popularity. He was already a well-known figure when elected for the first time. He commanded respect and admiration, given his low social origins and long struggle for political success against the odds. Furthermore, his ability to 'connect' with poorer voters in direct and simple language via the media, often inviting ridicule from wealthier and better educated citizens and politicians, gave him high visibility and popular credibility. These traits undoubtedly helped him bond directly with the electorate and to remain aloof from the infamous political-financial scandals that had so adversely affected the image of the Workers' Party.
Yet opinion on the electoral impact of Bolsa Família is not unanimous. Corrêa (n.d.) qualifies the admitted importance of the program in President da Silva's electoral success with the observation that the program polarised national opinion in Brazil, leading to losses in support from wealthier regions in the South and Southeast. This political cost is also acknowledged elsewhere as the inevitable consequence of self-interested, 'pocketbook' voting (Hunter & Power, 2007) . Another researcher, however, casts doubt on the alleged link between voting patterns and Bolsa Família coverage, arguing that there was no significant swing in votes to the President and the Workers' Party between 2002 (Bohn, 2011 ).
Yet majority opinion is heavily in favour of the positive electoral role of Bolsa Família. The Brazilian case is also reinforced by evidence from around the world that political choices are highly responsive to government income transfers (Arnold et al., 2011) .
The potential electoral importance of Bolsa Família is underscored by its high profile in the administration of President da Silva's successor, President Dilma Rousseff, who took office in January 2011. She has gone out of her way to stress the government's continuing commitment to the program, aiming to incorporate it into wider national development plans.
It remains protected from public spending cuts, although in fact Bolsa Familia is relatively cheap. In 2007-08, the program consumed R$11 billion (US$6.9 billion), or 65 percent of the social assistance budget for the poorest groups, which itself accounts for about 8 percent of total social spending (Hall, 2008) . Bolsa Família funding rose to R$13.4 billion in 2011 which corresponds to roughly 0.4 percent of GDP. However, this is but a drop in the ocean compared with Brazil's highly regressive pensions system, which absorbs around 11 percent of GDP and is more costly to administer.
Structural Implications
The electoral advantage conferred by Bolsa Família on the government is the most obvious political dimension of Brazil's social protection policy. Yet other dimensions, arguably, have more profound political implications than those expressed in vote swings.
These concern potential changes in national planning psychology based on income-transfer dependence. Coupled with this are subtle alterations in the way social policy is conceived, with far greater emphasis being placed on short-term safety nets to alleviate poverty rather than engaging in more fundamental social investments, especially in education.
As with all other cash transfer programs over the world, Bolsa Família has been accused of creating a 'culture of dependence'; the poor are portrayed as relying increasingly on government hand-outs and becoming work-shy. Such fears are exacerbated by doubts often raised over the extent to which it is feasible to enforce conditionalities. Welfare critics in the industrialised as well as the developing world have long employed the welfaredependence argument, but the evidence from Latin America on the impact of conditional cash transfers does not support this line of reasoning. Data from Brazil and Mexico show that program participation is not generally associated with employment decisions (Bastagli, 2011) . The exception might be in cases where recruitment into the formal sector could compromise Bolsa Família eligibility, thereby strengthening informalization of the labour market.
Bolsa Família is one of a number of non-contributory income transfer programs in Brazil, including rural pensions. Together, these account for over half the household income of the poorest groups. This is especially pronounced in poorer rural areas, where employment opportunities are scarce, as in the Northeast and North. In large cities such as São Paulo there has been a growing trend towards informal sector employment (Figueiredo et al., 2005) .
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Bolsa Família may perversely strengthen this tendency by discouraging formal registration for employment, which carries with it the risk of disqualifying beneficiaries from the program if their incomes exceed the threshold.
Financial dependence also extends to the municipal level. Studies show that some municipalities, through which Bolsa Família is executed, rely on the program for up to 40 percent of their overall budgets, especially in the Northeast (Marques, 2005) . Many local politicians are reputed to rely on such transfers to avoid imposing extra local taxes and thus help retain popular support during municipal elections. Notwithstanding the undoubted political capital accrued by the president and the federal administration, this command over guaranteed income allows municipal mayors to reinforce their influence and to reap the electoral benefits as well, along the 'bossist' lines discussed above.
The creation of what some critics see as a 'hand-out' mentality akin to charity has implications other than the creation of a so-called 'dependency culture'. Its popularity and high political payoff could encourage a short-term perspective in social policy. This would lead decision-makers to place increasing value on interventions to reward households for their partisan support, while de-prioritising less politically remunerative investments in basic social infrastructure. With some understatement, an official research document declared that Bolsa Família has now become consolidated into a "fundamental dimension of Brazilian social protection" (IPEA, 2010, p. 60) .
There is some evidence that a transition towards short-termism may already be taking place. As noted, Bolsa Família gives good electoral value for money, accounting for just 3 percent of the social budget. It is based on the expectation that it will strengthen demand for basic education and health services, thus enhancing human capital in the development process. However, although demand may well increase, there is no guarantee that the quality of services provided will grow concomitantly, since public provision is often unresponsive to such diffuse pressure (Farrington & Slater, 2006) . There might even be a perverse effect, as the result of which the effectiveness of Bolsa Familia in dragging people above the poverty 13 line through cash transfers could be used as an excuse to justify lower levels of investment in fundamental social sectors such as health and education (Handa & Davis, 2006) .
Research on social spending in Brazil suggests that the rise in non-contributory social welfare schemes such as Bolsa Família has been paralleled by falling per capita investment in several key social sectors at federal, state and municipal levels. One major study of government spending on basic sanitation, housing and education from 2002 to 2004 noted a consistent drop in funding in these sectors and concluded that, 'there has been no coordinated effort at federal or sub-national levels to provide essential public services indispensable for the reduction of inequalities in lifestyle and improvements in welfare alongside improvements in individual and family income and consumption' (Lavinas, 2007 (Lavinas, , p. 1467 .
Only time will tell whether social investments are likely to become a victim of the new emphasis on cash transfers, either directly or indirectly.
Education is a fundamental sector in which long-term investment in supply rather than palliative tinkering with demand is essential. The truth is that encouraging school attendance through Bolsa Família will have a limited impact if the quality of education actually delivered remains poor through lack of government spending on infrastructure.
While support for the program continues apace, untrammelled by budget cuts, investment in basic education in Brazil has lagged behind that of other countries at the same level of economic development. This problem in Brazilian social sector spending in education came under the spotlight many years ago (Birdsall & Sabot, eds., 1996) . The situation is still critical; there is continuing overinvestment in higher education at the expense of basic education. Not only does this perpetuate educational and social inequality, but it has also led to severe shortages in supplies of qualified labour as the economy has expanded (Prada, 2011) .
Another less tangible aspect of increasing reliance on conditional cash transfers as a cornerstone of social policy is that it could induce changes in the mind-set of policy-makers.
Cash transfers such as Bolsa Família have their place because they can be a highly effective, low cost instrument for addressing absolute poverty, as well as being politically attractive.
The risk, however, is that due to their high political payoff, conditional cash transfers will come to be viewed increasingly as mainstream, long-term policy occupying centre-stage, rather than providing temporary relief, as they were originally conceived. In order to address this apparent policy contradiction, the short-term poverty relief goals of conditional cash transfers should be integrated with social and economic investment plans to maximise their development impact. As observed more generally, the longer-term success of these programs in fighting poverty 'depends on insertion into the wider economy, notably through rural employment and labour market policies' (de la Brière & Rawlings, 2006, p. 25) . Social protection can be 'transformative' if used not just as a hand out but also as a tool for strengthening livelihoods (IDS, 2006) . A second political dimension concerns the structural implications of a growing reliance on cash transfers as mainstream social policy. Precisely because of their popularity and the political capital generated, cash transfers could lead to policy-makers' attentions being focused increasingly on short-run measures, while critical investments in basic, longterm social infrastructure in education, health and sanitation are neglected. Such a trade-off, if realised, would illustrate the high political cost of over-reliance on safety nets and, arguably, be prejudicial for wider economic and social development. It is therefore incumbent on future governments to systematically integrate poverty relief through cash transfers with national development plans and employment creation. In Brazil's case, it remains to be seen whether plans to extend conditional cash transfers further still further will bear such fruit.
Not only are the program's political functions are likely to become consolidated but they now extend well beyond Brazil's borders. A third political dimension to Bolsa Família is clearly emerging as a result of Brazil's growing presence on the international stage, with the exercise of 'soft power' through its social policies. Lula's declared personal commitment to the 'war against hunger' rather than against terror, as part of Brazil's reformulation of a more flexible foreign policy, has given the country a special diplomatic niche as a leader in discussions over world economic and social justice (Nina, 2007) . While Brazil promotes international cooperation and spreads the lessons of Bolsa Família to interested nations in Africa and elsewhere, its renowned conditional cash transfer program could thus serve another political objective. It could strengthen relations with other countries seeking similar solutions for poverty, thus helping to forge a new and shared vision, for better or worse, of what constitutes mainstream social policy in an increasingly globalized world.
